Are you too nice to negotiate?
Nov, 2009
Being nice in a negotiation encourages deception and opportunistic betrayal by the other party.
Research from Melbourne Business School finds that negotiators need to convey competence not niceness.
According to Mara Olekalns, MBS Professor of Management (Negotiations), competence implies that the other party is more likely to keep promises and to use information to create a good deal for both negotiators. These qualities mean that a negotiator is more willing to give accurate information to the other party.
She says, "Deception is also shaped by the distribution of power, perceived trustworthiness of the other party and a negotiator's own emotional state "
Her research has found that the most likely trigger for deception is an environment where one person feels they will be exploited.
This concern is amplified when one party has more power than the other party, and it is weakened by positive emotions.
"My research shows that positive emotions increases creativity and encourages greater risk taking, and decreases the extent to which individuals scrutinize information," Mara says. "Deception requires creativity, risk and is assisted by the belief that the other party might be less likely to scrutinize information."
Where power is distributed unevenly, negotiators who express anger are also likely to misrepresent information, and those who express anxiety are likely to withhold information.
Conversely negotiators who express optimism are also unlikely to misrepresent or withhold information.
Mara explains that this means that to be effective, negotiators must adapt their questioning to the emotional expression used by the other party. They in turn must monitor their own language and convey competence, rather than niceness, to avoid being perceived as someone who is not giving accurate information.
She advises, they need to simultaneously assess the context and actions of the other party to determine the probability and nature of deception, while managing their own behaviour to prevent a downward spiral of increasingly limited or inaccurate information exchange.
All of this is referred to as a fair trade model of deception.
There are two models of ethical decision making - fair trade and opportunistic betrayal.
Using the fair trade decision making model negotiators assess the likelihood of exploitation to be low, so they conclude the other party will not behave exploitatively and their need to act self-protectively by deceiving the other part is reduced. The costs of deception (relational damage) outweigh the benefits.
Using the opportunistic betrayal model, individuals base their decision to betray trust on the likelihood that their betrayal will be detected and punished. When they conclude the likelihood of detection is low they increase their use of deception to gain personal advantage. The benefits of deception outweigh the cost.
Mara claims that when negotiators have evidence that the other party will keep commitments or when they themselves feel optimistic, deception decreases. Conversely when negotiators express negative emotions, deception increases.
These effects are amplified by the level of dependence each negotiator has on the other. When negotiators have the same level of power they are mutually dependent. When they have different levels of power, they are nonmutually dependent.
A negotiator with high trust, positive emotions combined with mutual dependence, led to reduction in deception.
A negotiator with low trust, negative emotions combined with a non mutual relationship led to an increase in deception.
These findings suggest that as more variables combine to increase concerns about the other party, negotiators choose to deceive.
Mara stresses that negotiators who focus on relationship building by identifying shared values and goals may be encouraging opportunistic betrayal.
For more information:
Mara Olekalns
Professor of Management (Negotiations)
Melbourne Business School
Tel; (03) 03 9349 8146
Mob: 0438 418 584
Editor, Negotiation and Conflict Management Research
http://www.iacm-conflict.org/ncmr/
